ENGLISH PAGE Column of This Month ! VOICE OF Mr.KAMIURA
28 FEB 2010
Japan Behind the News Revising
the Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement
By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst
Translated by Alan Gleason
The Japan-U.S. Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) is the treaty under which Japan provides bases on its soil for use by the U.S. military. SOFA also stipulates various forms of preferential treatment for the troops and civilian staff stationed on those bases and their families.
Among these perquisites are exemption from taxation, and immunity from interrogation or arrest when crimes are committed by base personnel on duty. If, for example, an on-duty U.S. soldier is driving a car off-base and causes a fatal traffic accident through his own negligence, the Japanese police cannot arrest him.
Except for heinous crimes such as murder, arson, or rape, American troops need not turn themselves over to Japanese law enforcement officers until they are actually indicted. That makes it difficult if not impossible for the Japanese to conduct effective investigations of such cases.
Nowadays the media are full of pronouncements that the controversy over relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station in Okinawa has snowballed into a major political dispute between the U.S. and Japan. In fact, however, a far greater challenge looms ahead for the two countries: revision of the Status of Forces Agreement.
Since its enactment in 1960, SOFA has never been revised. The U.S. government has adamantly opposed any changes to it, and the Japanese government has been loath to challenge the U.S. In Japan, the agreement is viewed as a classic example of an unequal treaty and is blamed for the country's continued subservience to the U.S.
Recently, as the U.S. government prepares to return some of its bases to Japanese jurisdiction, SOFA has come under scrutiny because it does not require the American side to restore the land to its original state. Moreover, Japanese environmental law does not apply to the U.S. bases, and on-site environmental inspections cannot be conducted there.
By contrast, American bases in Korea and Germany are subject to the environmental laws of the host country, and local governments may enter them to conduct inspections. Different rules, however, apply to Japan.
According to its own realignment “road map,” the U.S. military eventually plans to return its bases to Japan. If the soil on those bases turns out to be contaminated with heavy metals and toxic chemicals, it is estimated that the clean-up costs could run to several trillion yen -- tens of billions of dollars.
So the question arises: who will pay for the clean-up? In Japan, revising the “environmental clause” in SOFA is now an urgent concern.
If this issue is not resolved in an effective manner, it could become a much more painful thorn in the side of the U.S.-Japan alliance than the current Futenma dispute.
Japanese
日本とアメリカは日米地位協定を結んでいる。その地位協定には日本が駐留アメリカ軍に基地を提供し、兵士や軍属とその家族にいろいろな優遇措置が明記されている。
まず免税であることや、公務中の米兵の犯罪は日本側に捜査や逮捕権がないと明記されている。もし米兵が公務中の運転なら、たとえ過失で死亡事故を起こしても日本の法律では逮捕されない。
また、殺人、放火、強姦など、凶悪事件以外は、起訴前に身柄を日本側に引き渡す必要はない。それでは日本の警察の取り調べが著しく制限される。それが地位協定なのだ。
今、日本では普天間飛行場の移設が日米間の大きな政治問題と報じられている。しかし実は日米地位協定の改定の方が、さらに重大な政治問題化することは必至だ。
日米地位協定は1960年に改定されて以来、一度も改定されていない。米政府が改定を拒否したことと、日本政府もアメリカに配慮したからだ。そのため日米地位協定は日本の対米追随の元凶といわれ、不平等協定の象徴になってきた。
特に最近、地位協定で米軍基地を日本に返還する際、米側に現状復帰の責任がないことが問題になってきた。また、米軍基地内であれば、日本の環境法が及ばず、立ち入り調査権がないことも不満を高めている。
韓国やドイツの米軍基地は、その国の環境法に従うことや、地方自治体の環境調査の立ち入りを認めている。それが日本では認められていない。
今後、米軍再編のロードマップに沿って、米軍基地が日本に返還される。もし基地内の土壌が重金属や化学物質によって汚染されていた場合、土壌を原状回復させる費用は数兆円という莫大な額が推測されている。
今後、この費用を日本と米側でどのように負担するのか。日米地位協定の「環境条項」をめぐる改定が大きな焦点になる。
この問題の解決策を誤ると、日米同盟関係は大きな痛手を受けることになる。
27 NOV 2009
The Futenma Base Relocation Controversy: Why
North Korea's Predicted Collapse Makes Kadena the Solution
By
Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst
Translated by Alan Gleason
Japan's mass media has portrayed the fledgling Hatoyama administration as finding itself stuck on the horns of a dilemma over the relocation of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station from its present location in a populated area of Okinawa.
And indeed, different members of the Hatoyama Cabinet are leaning in different directions as they desperately seek a solution. Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa supports moving the Futenma facilities to a more isolated coastal location at the Marines' Camp Schwab; this was the solution that the Japanese and American governments agreed upon in a 2006 protocol.
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada, on the other hand, has proposed merging Futenma's operations into the island's largest U.S. air base, Kadena. And Prime Minister Hatoyama himself has said he wants to study moving them out of Okinawa altogether, or even out of Japan.
Meanwhile, on recent visits to Japan, U.S. President Obama and Defense Secretary Robert Gates have both pressed the Japanese government to abide by the 2006 Camp Schwab plan. Some pundits have even taken to making dire warnings that the U.S.-Japan alliance could break down over the issue.
If you look past the political posturing and diplomatic haggling, however, the only realistic option available to the two sides is, in my view, to integrate Futenma with Kadena.
The reason for this can be found in the primary mission of the U.S. Marines in Okinawa. They are deployed there to support U.S. forces in South Korea in the event of an invasion from the North. From Okinawa, the Marines could be moved very quickly into the Korean Peninsula.
In other words, the Marines in Okinawa serve as a forward deployment force that would enter Korea first while Army and Navy personnel from the U.S. mainland bring up the rear.
If, however, the present North Korean regime collapses as predicted, U.S. forces will withdraw from the South and the Marines will no longer be needed in Okinawa. As for China, the Marines are not equipped to make a frontal attack on so large a country. That would be the job of the U.S. Army, Navy and Air Force.
Today, the chances of North Korea attacking the South are close to zero, which makes the construction of a big, brand-new Marine Corps base in Okinawa all but moot, and the merger of Futenma into Kadena highly plausible.
Adjacent to Kadena Air Base is the vast Kadena Ammunition Storage Area, which covers an area 1.3 times as large as the base itself. But as U.S. forces rely increasingly on precision-guided munitions, the amount of ammunition stored at Kadena has dropped precipitously. That opens up more than enough land on which to build a runway for the Marine Corps helicopters now flying out of Futenma.
The major objection raised by the U.S. side to the use of Kadena for this purpose is that the two existing Kadena runways would have to be shared by Air Force fighters and Marine helicopters. Building a new helicopter facility on an unused section of the Ammunition Storage Area should remove this objection.
Japanese
沖縄の市街地にある米海兵隊の普天間飛行場を移設する案で、日本のメディアは鳩山政権が窮地に立ったと報じている。
北沢防衛大臣は日米が06年に合意したキャンプ・シュワブ沿岸への移設を支持している。岡田外相は嘉手納基地に統合することを提案した。鳩山首相は沖縄以外の県や国外を検討したいとしている。閣内の3人がそれぞれ別の方向を向いているからだ。
さらにゲーツ国防長官とオバマ大統領が来日し、キャンプ・シュワブ案を履行するように強く求めたと報じられた。このままでは日米同盟が破綻するという危機説まで飛び出している。
しかし政治や外交の駆け引きを差し引けば、普天間基地移転は嘉手納基地統合しかないというのが私の考えだ。
なぜなら沖縄の海兵隊は、韓国に駐留する米軍を助けるために駐留している。北朝鮮が韓国に攻めてくれば、直ちに朝鮮半島に緊急出動して在韓米軍を支援するためである。
その間に米本土から、米陸軍や米海軍が応援に駆けつけるという前方展開戦略である。
しかし北朝鮮が消滅し、在韓米軍が韓国から撤退すれば、在沖の海兵隊は沖縄に存在する意味を失う。海兵隊は中国という大国に正面から対決する軍隊ではない。それは米国の陸・海・空軍の役割である。
今は、北朝鮮が韓国に攻めてくる可能性は限りなくゼロに近いのに、沖縄に新たに巨大海兵隊新基地を造る意味がないというのが嘉手納統合案の根幹である。
嘉手納基地には隣接して嘉手納弾薬庫がある。そして弾薬庫の敷地が嘉手納基地の1,3倍という広大なのである。アメリカ軍は精密誘導兵器の普及で、弾薬庫に貯蔵する弾薬量が激減した。そこで嘉手納弾薬庫の一部に海兵隊のヘリ部隊用の滑走路建設は可能である。
それなら米軍に不評な嘉手納基地の2本の滑走路を、空軍の戦闘機と海兵隊のヘリ部隊が共有する必要はない。嘉手納統合案は軍事的な合理性があるのだ。
26 SEP 2009
Have They Cancelled the Relocation of Futenma
Air Station?
By Motoaki Kamiura, Military
Analyst Translated
by Alan Gleason
The odds are
growing that the controversial 2006 agreement between the U.S. and Japanese
governments to move the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station to another
location on the island of Okinawa will be cancelled. Indeed, perhaps
it already has been.
Located in the midst of a densely populated residential area in the
central part of the island, Futenma has long been a sore point with
Okinawans because of the potentially catastrophic consequences of an
air crash in the neighborhood. The two governments therefore agreed
to build a new air base to replace Futenma further up the coast at Camp
Schwab, another Marine Corps facility.
However, in the national parliamentary elections that took place on
August 30, all four pro-relocation candidates for Okinawa's single-seat
constituencies were defeated by four candidates who oppose building
the new base.
Local elections in June 2008 had already given anti-base candidates
a majority over pro-base legislators in the Okinawa Prefectural Assembly.
In July that year the Assembly passed a resolution opposing the new
base construction.
Local opposition has also forced suspension of the environmental assessment
legally required before the base can be built, and no date has been
set for construction to begin.
It was amid this impasse that some unexpected news suddenly put a new
spin on the situation. In April this year, the U.S. proposed to Japan
that it remove some of the fifty F-15 fighter aircraft deployed at Kadena
Air Base, the largest military facility on Okinawa. The U.S. also indicated
it was planning to remove all forty F-16 fighters from Misawa Air Base
in northern Japan.
Until now the conventional wisdom had been that the U.S. would not withdraw
its fighters from Misawa and Kadena before the collapse of the North
Korean regime. Now, however, it appears that the Americans have concluded
that North Korea no longer poses enough of a military threat to warrant
deployment of these aircraft.
If a number of F-15s are removed from Kadena, that would provide room
for the base to absorb the aircraft currently at Futenma, obviating
the need for construction of a new facility. From the standpoint of
military operations, that is clearly the more efficient solution.
Besides, if the North Korean threat has really subsided to that degree,
the necessity of spending an estimated 1 trillion yen (over US$10 billion)
to build a new base seems increasingly open to question. For one thing,
Okinawa is too close to China to serve effectively as a bulwark against
that country's military.
Thus it seems likely that the Camp Schwab construction project will
be cancelled, if it has not in fact been already.
Foreign Minister Katsuya Okada of the newly installed Hatoyama Cabinet
recently stated that, whereas the manifesto of the now-ruling Democratic
Party of Japan (DPJ) until last year included language declaring that
Futenma should be moved “out of the prefecture or out of Japan,” the
revised manifesto issued for the August general election did not include
the words “out of the prefecture.”
All signs, then, would seem to point to a neat resolution of the Futenma
relocation problem that has vexed Okinawans for so many years: it will
simply be absorbed into Kadena.
Japanese
日米両政府が06年に合意した米海兵隊・普天間飛行場の移設がキャンセルされる可能性が高くなった。
市街地の中心にある普天間飛行場は、航空機が墜落した際、大惨事が起きることが予測された。そこで日米政府が合意したのが米軍キャンプ・シュワブ基地沿岸に新基地を建設する移設案だった。
しかし今年8月末の衆議院選では、新基地建設を推進する4人の自民党候補(小選挙区)はすべて落選し、新基地反対を訴えた4人の野党候補が当選した。
昨年6月の沖縄県議会選挙でも、与野党が逆転する結果となり、新基地反対を訴える議員が議会の過半数を越える結果となった。
これを受けて翌月の7月、沖縄県議会では基地建設反対決議が行われている。
基地建設に必要な環境評価調査(アセスメント)も、地元の反対で中断したまま、工事着工のめどさえついていない。
ここにきて大きなニュースが飛び込んできた。それは今年4月上旬に、嘉手納基地の米空軍F15戦闘機(50機)の削減を米政府が日本政府に打診してきたという。同時に米空軍・三沢基地のF16戦闘機約40機をすべて撤収させる計画も示されていた。
今までは、三沢と嘉手納の米空軍戦闘機部隊は、北朝鮮の崩壊を見届けて撤退するものと思っていた。しかしアメリカは、もはや北朝鮮の軍事的脅威に備える必要性がなくなったと判断したと思われる。
となると、普天間飛行場の移設問題は、F15の撤退(一部)で余裕ができた嘉手納基地に収容するほうが、軍事基地としての効率性がはるかに高い。
それに北朝鮮の軍事的な脅威が消滅したのに、約1挑円の建設費を投入して、新基地を建設する必然性が問われることになる。中国に対峙する基地としては、沖縄はあまりに中国に近すぎるからだ。
以上のような事情から、キャンプ・シュワブ沿岸に新基地建設はキャンセルされたと思われる。
鳩山新政権で外相になった岡田氏は、「昨年までの民主党マニフェストでは、普天間飛行場の移転先は「県外か国外」と書いているが、今年の衆院選のマニフェストでは県外という言葉は入っていない」と話す。
長く沖縄県民を悩ませた普天間飛行場移設問題は、嘉手納に移転することで、ひとまず終止符が打たれる見方が強まった。
24 JUL 2009
Why the Japanese Government Keeps Denying
Its Secret Nuclear Agreement
By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst
Translated by Alan Gleason
For years rumors have circulated
of a secret Japan-U.S. agreement to permit the movement of American
nuclear weapons through Japan. Ryohei Murata, a former vice foreign
minister, recently admitted that this was so: Japan tacitly allowed
U.S. warships carrying nuclear weapons to dock at Japanese ports and
pass through Japanese waters. Yet the government continues to aver that
no such pact ever existed.
What makes this stance absurd is the fact that the secret agreement
is no secret. Declassified American documents describe it in detail.
U.S. Rear Admiral Gene La Roque mentioned it in testimony as far back
as 1974, and U.S. Ambassador to Japan Edwin Reischauer did so again
in 1981.
Yet Chief Cabinet Secretary Takeo Kawamura's response to Murata's statement
was the usual refrain: no such agreement exists. When the other party
to the pact, the U.S., has already released documents proving it does,
why does Japan continue to maintain that it does not?
The Cold War is long over, and U.S. naval vessels dispatched overseas
no longer carry nuclear weapons. Few if any observers think that admitting
to the existence of this agreement would cause any problems for the
U.S.-Japan alliance.
But the Japanese government has its reasons for staying on message.
Three, in fact -- the Three Non-Nuclear Principles which, though never
made into law, are Japan's de facto policy on nuclear issues. The principles
are that Japan shall neither possess nor manufacture nuclear weapons,
nor permit their introduction into Japanese territory. The government
fears that open acknowledgement of its blatant violation of Principle
No. 3 all these years could render the principles completely toothless.
It is not quite ready to do that.
If the principles lose their credibility as government policy, pressure
on Japan -- both internal and external -- to go nuclear (including the
introduction of U.S. nukes) would grow intense. North Korea's recent
nuclear tests have already raised the ante in that regard.
The government thus feels compelled to deny the existence of a secret
agreement violating the Non-Nuclear Principles precisely because it
fears what would happen if those principles were proven moot.
Conservative elements in the Japanese media are already clamoring for
the government to admit that it has been letting U.S. nukes into Japanese
territory all along, and to take that logic a step further to reinforce
Japan's nuclear umbrella.
Japanese
日本政府が「核密約はない」と主張し続ける訳
「日本は核兵器を搭載した米軍艦船の寄港や領海通過を黙認する。――という日米の密約があった」。そのように語ったのは村田良平・元外務次官だ。しかし日本政府は今まで一貫して密約を否定し続けている。
この密約の存在は、すでに米側の公文書公開で詳細に知られている。またラロック提督の証言(74年)やライシャワー元駐日大使の発言(81年)でも明らかにされている。
しかし今回の村田氏の証言でも、河村官房長官は「密約は存在しない」と繰り返し述べた。一方の当事者である米側が、公文書を公開して密約は事実と証明しているのに、なぜ日本政府は否定を続けるのか。
すでに米ソ冷戦は終わり、海外任務の米軍艦船は核兵器搭載をしていない。今、密約を認めても日米同盟に問題は起こらないという意見が多数である。
それでも日本政府が認めない理由は、日本の核兵器政策である非核三原則「持たず、作らず、持ち込ませず」が空洞化するのを避けるためだ。
もはや日本の国是同様になった非核三原則が虚言だったとして、その効力を失えば、北朝鮮の核実験実施という現実に直面した日本で、核武装(米軍の核持ち込みを含む)への期待が強まることを防ぐためだ。
すなわち日本政府は、非核三原則を維持するために、あえて密約を否定して、その空洞化阻止を図るしかないのだ。 すでに日本の保守系メディアでは、米軍の核持ち込みを認め、非核二原則であっても確かな核の傘を求める論調が出始めている。
27 MAR 2009
Perspective from Japan Ozawa's Scandal and the Okinawa Base Issue
By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst Translated by Alan Gleason
Takanori Okubo, chief secretary to Ichiro Ozawa, president of the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), has been indicted for alleged illegal fundraising activities. Until the fundraising scandal erupted, the DPJ was expected to trounce the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in the upcoming Lower House election, which by law must be held no later than this autumn.
Ozawa was therefore widely regarded as the most likely pick for the nation's next prime minister. Yet the Tokyo District Prosecutor's Office chose this moment to arrest the man in charge of Ozawa's finances on charges of making false reports on political donations. Pundits say that in the past, such violations would have been remedied simply by filing a revised report.
What are we to make of the prosecutors' timing in taking an action that they had to know would create a scandal of momentous repercussions and invite accusations of political conspiracy?
One possible explanation involves the DNP's declaration that, should it assume power as the new ruling party, it would reconsider Japan's commitment to the United States to move the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station to another location on the island of Okinawa.
The U.S. and Japan have already reaffirmed several times, in writing, an agreement to build a replacement for Futenma at the Marines' Camp Schwab in Nago City on the northern part of the island.
On December 19, 2008, newly appointed U.S. Ambassador to Japan Joseph Nye visited the country and met in a Tokyo hotel with Ozawa's two top lieutenants, DNP Deputy Chief Naoto Kan and Secretary General Yukio Hatoyama. At this meeting Nye came right to the point and informed them that any move by the DNP to renegotiate the Futenma plan or the overall U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) would be regarded as an anti-American gesture.
Also present, reports say, was Kurt Campbell, the former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for Asia and the Pacific in charge of negotiations for the Futenma agreement on the American side. However, neither of the DNP representatives voiced a commitment one way or the other.
When Secretary of State Hillary Clinton visited Japan in February, she spoke directly with Ozawa about the Futenma issue. Once again, Ozawa refused to commit himself to building a new base at Camp Schwab. Ozawa and the DNP find it hard to give a straight answer because the issue is a thorny one, involving a complex web of political and economic interests on the part of the citizens of Nago City and Okinawa Prefecture, local businessmen, and politicians and bureaucrats.
Meanwhile, another pronouncement by Ozawa, that the U.S. Navy's Seventh Fleet should be a “sufficient” U.S. military presence in Japan, generated more controversy. His remark was taken by the American side as further indication that Ozawa may have already decided to scrap the entire Camp Schwab construction plan.
On March 7, immediately after the arrest of Ozawa's secretary, Prime Minister Taro Aso of the LDP made a sudden trip to Okinawa. Aso did not visit Futenma or the Camp Schwab site, but simply met with the governor of Okinawa, issued a message that he would put all his effort into resolving the U.S. base problem, and flew back to Tokyo.
Behind the indictment of Ozawa's secretary a powerful political dynamic is unquestionably at work, and one of its consequences has been to thrust the Futenma issue to the fore again.
Japanese「小沢秘書逮捕で普天間基地移転が再始動か」
小沢一郎・民主党代表の政治資金を管理する公設第一秘書が逮捕された。遅くとも、この秋までに予定されている総選挙では、メディアの世論調査で、自民党は大敗して民主党が大勝すると推測されていた。
それなのに東京地検特捜部は、次期首相候補に最も近い民主党代表の金庫番を、政治資金の収支報告書虚偽記載で逮捕した。従来なら、修正申告で済む問題だと言われている。
なぜ東京地検特捜部は国策捜査と非難されることを覚悟で、この時期に、どのような理由で大ナタを振り下ろしたのか。
ここで鮮明に思い浮かぶのは、民主党が政権を取れば普天間基地(沖縄県)を同県の米軍キャンプ・シュワブ沿岸に移転案を、すべてリセットしてゼロから検討を始めると表明したことである。(産経新聞 1月6日付け)
米海兵隊がキャンプ・シュワブ沿岸に、普天間基地の代替え基地を作ることは、すでに日米政府が何度も合意し、確認文書を取り交わした経緯があった。
昨年12月19日、次期駐日米大使に内定していたジョセフ・ナイ氏が来日し、都内のホテルで民主党の菅直人民主党代表代行と鳩山邦夫幹事長と会い、ナイ氏は「日米地位協定や普天間飛行場の移転見直しに動いたら反米と受け止める」とクギを刺したという。
この会談の席には、普天間基地移転問題を米側代表でまとめたキャンベル元国防副次官補がいたという情報もある。しかし民主党幹部の二人から責任ある言葉は出なかった。
2月、クリントン国務長官が初訪日した際にも、小沢代表と普天間基地移転問題を話し合った。小沢代表はキャンプ・シュワブ基地沿岸に代替基地建設の確約はしなかった。名護市の地元住民、沖縄県、地元産業界、政治家や官僚など、普天間代替基地をめぐる移転問題は複雑な政治利権が絡み合い、動きが取れない状態だからだった。
そんな時、小沢代表の「在日米軍のプレゼンスは第7艦隊で十分」という発言が飛び出した。これをアメリカ側はキャンプ・シュワブ沿岸基地建設が、また反古にされたと判断した可能性はある。
小沢秘書が逮捕された直後の3月7日、突然、麻生首相は沖縄を訪問した。課題の普天間基地やキャンプ・シュワブ沿岸を視察することなく、形式的に県知事と会談し、「米軍基地問題に全力で取り組む」とだけメッシージを残して帰京した。
小沢秘書逮捕の裏に、大きな政治力学が作用し、これで普天間移転問題が再び現実問題に復帰したことは間違いない。
25 JAN 2009
A Perspective from Japan Back to Square One: The Futenma Agreement
By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst Translated by Alan Gleason
Incoming Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has assured Japan that under the Obama administration, the U.S.-Japan alliance is still a “cornerstone” of American policy in Asia. However, an old issue has resurfaced that already threatens to disturb that alliance. The 1996 accord between the two governments on the transfer of the U.S. Marine Corps' Futenma Air Station to another location in Okinawa has unraveled.
Sitting smack in the middle of the densely populated Ginowan district of central Okinawa island, Futenma has long attracted local ire for its noise pollution and the occasional tendency of U.S. aircraft to crash in nearby neighborhoods. This friction prompted the U.S. and Japanese governments to agree to move Futenma's flight operations by 2014 to a new facility to be built in the less populated northern part of the island.
But the initial plan -- a 2,000-meter runway to be built on landfill offshore at Henoko, Nago city -- foundered on demands by then-governor Keiichi Inamine that the facility be available for joint military-civilian use and that U.S. forces vacate the premises in 15 years. The Americans rejected these conditions.
The two governments then agreed on an alternative plan to build two 1,800-meter runways in a V configuration onshore at Camp Schwab, an existing Marine base adjacent to Henoko. But the local populace, enraged that it had not been consulted, galvanized in its opposition to the new plan.
Eventually, however, the locals grudgingly consented to the Camp Schwab alternative when the Japanese government threatened to cut off its annual infusion of 10 billion yen (US$100 million) into the northern district for “economic redevelopment.”
But this consent came with strings attached. The Okinawans demanded that the Camp Schwab runways be moved offshore onto landfill, ostensibly because the onshore location would put the homes of local residents directly under the flight path. The Japanese government rejected this demand, arguing that it was just a ploy by the Okinawans to make more money off the landfill construction required offshore. Once again, the Futenma relocation project ran aground.
In the Prefectural Assembly elections in June 2008, Okinawa's opposition party, which had come out against the onshore construction at Camp Schwab, swept into power with a solid majority of seats. In July the Assembly passed a resolution opposing the relocation plan. Since then, the Alternative Facility Council, a coalition of supporters of relocation, including representatives of the national and prefectural governments, Nago city, and local businesspeople, has gone dormant, with no plans announced for further meetings.
Meanwhile, on the national level, the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), favored to win the Lower House election slated for later this year, has pledged to replace the long-dominant Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) administration with a new one. The DPJ has revealed that it is “studying” the possibility of wiping the slate clean of all Futenma relocation plans agreed upon to date by the U.S. and Japanese governments. If so, the entire process could be sent back to the drawing board.
Futenma could thus become a major thorn in the sides of both the Obama administration and a new DPJ-led government. Meanwhile, as the issue awaits resolution, residents of Ginowan continue to worry about aircraft from Futenma crashing into their houses.
Japanese「政 権 交 代 で 普 天 間 移 転 は 白 紙」
オバマ新政権のアジア外交では、日本との同盟が最重要とクリントン国務長官が表明した。しかしその同盟を根底から揺るがす問題が浮上している。日米両政府が1996年に合意した普天間飛行場(沖縄県)の移転計画が暗礁に乗り上げている。
宜野湾市の中心部にある米海兵隊の普天間飛行場は、市街地への墜落事故の危険や騒音問題から、2014年までに沖縄県内の代替施設に移転する合意だった。
しかし沖縄北部の名護市辺野古沖合を埋め立て、2000メートル滑走路の代替施設を作る案は、稲嶺県知事(当時)の軍民共用と米軍の15年間使用限定が、米側と激しく対立して計画はストップした。
その後、名護市辺野古に隣接する米軍キャンプ・シュワブ基地の沿岸部に1800メートルの滑走路2本を持つV字案に日米政府が再合意した。しかしこのV字案は、日米政府が勝手に合意したと、無視された地元が強硬に反発した。
しかし地元は、日本政府が01年から11年までの10年間、毎年100億円を北部地区の産業振興資金を打ち切ると報じられると、渋々V字案に合意した。
だが地元は、現在の沿岸部案を沖合数百メートルに出すように要求した。滑走路延長上に集落があるからという理由からだった。しかし政府は、沖合に出せば、埋め立て面積の拡大で地元に落ちる埋め立て費を増やす利権のためと拒絶した。再び代替基地建設は暗礁に乗り上げてしまった。
昨年6月には、沖縄県議選でキャンプ・シュワブ沿岸部の基地建設に反対する野党が大勝して過半数を占めた。7月には県議会で代替基地建設反対の決議が可決された。それ以降、日本政府、沖縄県、名護市などと地元業者で構成される「代替施設協議会」は開かれず、次回開催の目処(めど)もたっていない。
今年になって次回の総選挙では政権交代すると報じられている民主党が、普天間移転で日米政府が合意した今までの代替基地建設案を白紙にすることを検討していることがわかった。普天間飛行場計画が最初の振り出しに戻る可能性が高くなった。
オバマ新政権と日本の新しい政権で普天間移転問題は再び動き出すのだろうか。その間にも、普天間基地周辺の市街地に米軍機が墜落する危険に市民は悩まされる。
