22

MAR

2008

19

JUN

2008

  Propaganda Wars: The Self-Defense

     Force's “Successful” Missile Intercept Test

     By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst
 Translated by Alan Gleason

On January 11, Japan's new Special Anti-Terrorism Law, touted by the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as its top priority during an extraordinary session of Parliament, was voted down by the opposition-controlled Upper House. That same day the LDP forced the bill through the Lower House, where it commands a two-thirds majority, for a second time. Under the Japanese Constitution, this allows the bill to become law.

Despite these strong-arm tactics, the opposition Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) abandoned earlier threats to submit a censure motion against Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda in the Upper House. Censure, the scenario went, would prevent Fukuda from participating in Upper House deliberations, forcing him to dissolve the Lower House and call for a general election.

So why did the DPJ drop its censure plan? The party's official reason was that it wanted to wait for a more appropriate occasion in late March, when the LDP will be struggling to pass bills on even more unpopular issues, the national pension scandal and extension of the gasoline tax.

More likely, however, the DPJ itself does not feel ready for a general election just yet. Also, looking ahead to its own future prospects as ruling party, it does not want to set a precedent for exercising the censure option every time the Upper and Lower Houses split on a vote.

Meanwhile, however, another defense-related controversy threatens to erupt. The government appeared to score a propaganda coup of sorts on December 18 when an SM-3 missile fired from the Maritime Self-Defense Force destroyer Kongo, recently outfitted with an Aegis missile defense system, intercepted a U.S.-launched missile in a joint test conducted in the Pacific Ocean near Hawaii.

TV news programs showed Defense Ministry officials in the missile control room applauding and shaking hands as the target exploded. Claims were made that Japan could now protect itself against North Korea's Nodong missile, which has a radius of 800 miles.

However, the SM-3 fired in the Pacific test only has a radius of 250 miles. To use it to intercept a Nodong, those test conditions would have to be duplicated. An Aegis-equipped destroyer would have to be positioned directly under the path of the incoming missile, which would have to be launched at a prearranged time and flown at a prescribed altitude of about 80 miles.

North Korea has about 200 Nodongs installed on mobile, trailer-style launch pads in a network of underground tunnels. Once brought up to the surface, a Nodong can be prepared for launch in a matter of hours, and can reach a target in Japan in seven to ten minutes. If Japan's Aegis ships are all in port, or on exercises somewhere other than the Japan Sea, they will be too far away to respond to a missile fired from North Korea.

Despite these caveats, Japan's mass media was quick to declare the December test a “success,” and this has the country's defense establishment worried. Officials fear that when citizens learn the truth about the test's limitations, they will accuse the Defense Ministry of engaging in a propaganda ploy -- a scheme to delude the public about a missile defense system that is currently budgeted at over nine billion U.S. dollars.

30

NOV

2007

A Perspective from Japan Clashing Parties: Could the Dispute over Japan's Role in the Afghan War Prompt a General Election?

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

Japan's Parliament is currently in the midst of a heated dispute over a new Special Anti-Terrorism Law designed to allow Japan to resume refueling operations in the Indian Ocean. Until the previous law expired on November 1, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) was refueling ships belonging to multinational forces in the region, ostensibly to assist in reestablishing security in Afghanistan.

However, the two leading parties -- the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) -- are at loggerheads over the legislation, and speculation is rife that the standoff could trigger the dissolution of the House of Representatives (Lower House) and a "general" (Lower House) election, the first since 2005.

The DPJ, which won a majority of seats in the House of Councillors (Upper House) election last summer, opposes resumption of the refueling operations. Party leader Ichiro Ozawa argues that SDF support of the Afghan war is unconstitutional because the war was launched by the United States for its own self-defense. The government currently interprets the Japanese Constitution as permitting Japan to defend itself but not to support other nations, even allies, in defending themselves.

When President Bush attacked Afghanistan in late 2001, he argued that the war was in self-defense because the ruling Taliban government was sheltering Al-Qaeda, which the U.S. held responsible for the terrorist attacks of September 11.

In the name of aiding in the security effort in Afghanistan, Japan subsequently passed a law approving the supply of fuel to coalition ships in the Indian Ocean. The MSDF conducted the refueling operations for six years until the law expired in the face of opposition to its extension from the DPJ.

When former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe suddenly resigned in September, he cited his inability to get the refueling law extended as the U.S. had requested. Just after meeting with President Bush on November 16, the new Prime Minister, Yasuo Fukuda, declared that resumption of the refueling operations was the most critical issue facing Japan.

Meanwhile, the resurgent DPJ, smelling an opportunity to seize the reins of government from the long-dominant LDP, wants to force the dissolution of the Lower House and hold a general election as soon as possible. The new refueling law has become a pawn in the struggle between the two parties.

The most likely scenario goes like this. The LDP has already forced the new refueling bill through the Lower House, but the DPJ will refuse to bring it to a vote in the Upper House. If the bill does not come up for a vote in sixty days, it can still become law if brought to a second vote in the Lower House and passed by a two-thirds majority, which the LDP coalition still has in the Lower House. But if the LDP does that, the DPJ will submit a censure motion against Fukuda in the Upper House, thereby compelling him to dissolve the Lower House for a general election.

If that is indeed what happens, the election could take place as early as mid-January next year.

29

SEP

2007

24

Jul

2007

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

Japan simultaneously embraces two mutually contradictory policies regarding nuclear weapons. As the only nation to experience a nuclear attack, it has presented a proposal for the abolition of nuclear arms to the United Nations General Assembly every year since 1994. At the same time, Japan assumes that if it ever comes under nuclear attack again, the United States will respond by attacking the attacker with nuclear weapons.

When Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma, in an address at Reitaku University in Chiba Prefecture on June 30, stated that the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki "couldn't be helped" (to use the most common English translation for shikataganai), he triggered intense public outrage and was forced to resign his post on July 3.

Kyuma began his political career as a parliamentary representative from Nagasaki, so part of the outcry was over his perceived insensitivity to the many atomic bomb victims in his own district. But more significant, in the view of many, was that by appearing to sanction the use of nuclear weapons, the defense minister was undermining Japan's anti-nuclear efforts at the U.N.

The deluge of criticism directed at Kyuma does not, however, mean that advocates of nuclear abolition have suddenly proliferated in Japan. Quite the contrary, voices calling for acquisition by Japan of its own nuclear arsenal, so as to free itself from dependence on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, are on the rise.

Professor Kiichi Fujiwara of Tokyo University, whose field is international history, wrote in the July 5 edition of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper that instead of making idealistic declarations about global nuclear disarmament, Japan should focus on devising a pragmatic policy for de-nuclearizing East Asia.

But Professor Fujiwara's statement implies that Japan should reject America's nuclear umbrella, and this stance is by no means supported by all Japanese citizens. Most Japanese, in fact, believe that their country needs the protection afforded by American nukes.

Unless it resolves the inherent contradiction between its non-nuclear proposals and its dependence on a nuclear umbrella, Japan will lose whatever trust it has built up among the family of nations.

29

MAY

2007

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

Elections for the House of Councillors -- the Upper House of Japan's Parliament -- take place every three years. The next one is this July.

Japan's Self-Defense Forces have the power to move one million votes, it is said: active personnel, retirees, and their families add up to a million eligible voters. And if the SDF goes into full get-out-the-vote mode, it could muster twice that many. Candidates for proportional representation seats in the Upper House need a minimum of about 300,000 votes to win election.

In the previous 2004 election, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party ran three Defense Agency veterans as proportional representation candidates, but all lost, with none receiving more than 100,000 votes. Since then the LDP has had no ex-Defense Agency or ex-SDF representatives in the Upper House.

The poor showing was caused by the dispatch of SDF troops to Iraq in January that same year. Both active and retired SDF personnel and their families were vehemently opposed to the Iraq deployment due to the lack of preparation, both legal and logistical, for this unprecedented commitment of SDF troops to an overseas combat zone.

So the LDP got off to an early start in its strategic preparations for the elections this July. The government has already withdrawn Ground SDF units from their base in Samawah, and the LDP is running Colonel Masahisa Sato, the mediagenic commander of the Samawah mission, as an Upper House candidate.

The choice of an active military man like Sato reflects the LDP's belief that the three candidates who lost in 2004 lacked popularity because they were all Defense Agency bureaucrats and civilians.

Finally, in what many call the LDP's boldest election gambit, the Defense Agency was promoted into a full-fledged ministry, the Ministry of Defense, on January 9 this year.

The old Defense Agency was low in the Cabinet hierarchy; its director could not submit budget requests directly to the Finance Minister, or legislative proposals to the Cabinet Council. Japanese security policy, particularly the security treaty with the U.S., was in the hands of the Foreign Ministry, while the Defense Agency was responsible mainly for running the Ground, Maritime and Air Self-Defense Forces.

The creation of a new Defense Ministry with the power to make policy was a long-cherished dream of both Agency bureaucrats and SDF personnel. By thus boosting the morale of Ministry staff and SDF troops, the LDP hopes to mobilize a million more votes in its favor.

27

MAR

2007

A Perspective from Japan

The China Containment Game: Japan, the U.S., India and Australia Team Up

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

In early April the Japanese, U.S. and Indian navies will hold their first joint exercises in the seas off Japan; they are to last about one week. Normally, when countries plan joint military maneuvers for the first time they choose to focus on radio communications and information exchange, declaring that the training is for rescue purposes in the event of shipboard fires, accidents and other maritime disasters.

These announcements are intended to assuage the fears of surrounding nations that the exercises might be for more aggressive military objectives, such as missile launching or submarine chasing. Once the Indian Navy begins participating in joint maneuvers with its Japanese and American counterparts in the Western Pacific, however, no one is likely to be more concerned than the Chinese Navy.

For the past 19 years China's military budget has grown by over ten percent annually. With that money it has purchased the latest weapons from Russia, conducted “Star Wars” experiments, augmented its submarine fleet and sent it into the Western Pacific, and developed and deployed new fighter aircraft. It has dispatched special troop units to neighboring countries, and the Chinese Army has been engaging in joint anti-terror and anti-guerilla exercises with the armies of Pakistan and Tajikistan.

Thus China's military might has finally begun looking outward. Picking up on this, the Japanese media have reported that the joint Japan-U.S.-India exercises are a response to China's forays into the Pacific.

Meanwhile, when Australian Prime Minister John Howard visited Japan in mid-March, the two countries agreed to set up a cabinet-level conference at which their foreign and defense ministers would regularly discuss security measures and diplomatic issues. Also decided was that Japan's Self-Defense Forces would perform joint exercises with Australian forces.

The Australian government, mindful that this would not be a good time to raise tensions further with the Chinese, has already stated that these cooperative efforts with Japan are not to be construed as a slap at China.

In reality, however, if Chinese military power continues to loom as a growing threat to the rest of Asia, there is no question that this new four-way alliance of Japan, the U.S., India and Australia will take on a confrontational posture vis-a-vis China.

At the moment it is impossible to predict whether the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) will take China's side or that of the four nations. But in any case, their military tie-up is clearly the opening gambit in a new game. It is also part of America's long-term strategy to prevent China from replacing it as the world's top military power.

27

JAN

2007

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst 

Translated by Alan Gleason

The F-22 Raptor, the U.S. Air Force's newest stealth fighter, has never been deployed overseas. But on February 10, twelve of the planes will arrive at Okinawa's Kadena Air Base. The Japanese Foreign Ministry has announced that the aircraft and their squadron will be stationed at Kadena for three months.

Another U.S. squadron of 15 to 20 F-117 fighters has already been at Kunsan Air Base in South Korea since January 11, with an announced deployment of four months.

Both the F-22 and the F-117 are state-of-the-art stealth aircraft, capable of penetrating the dense antiaircraft network North Korea has installed along the Demilitarized Zone, and of attacking North Korean military installations.

The three months from mid-February to mid-May during which these planes will be stationed in both Japan and South Korea are precisely the period when North Korea will face a severe food crisis. Crops (primarily rice and potatoes) harvested last fall will run out before the winter is over. But it will still be far too cold to grow anything, and people will either endure hunger until spring or starve to death.

Once the weather warms up a bit, however, starving North Koreans will venture out in search of food. If they cannot obtain it then, riots are likely to occur. Potential trouble spots include grain storehouses in each district of the country, trains carrying foodstuffs, and harbors where ships with emergency food supplies from overseas are docked. Food riots erupting in any of these places would spread quickly across the entire country.

If food riots or a coup d'etat should occur and the present regime begins to collapse, there is a concern that some factions of the North Korean military could engage in reckless maneuvers in the belief that South Korean and U.S. forces were attacking. The purpose of those stealth fighters in Japan and South Korea is to attack any out-of-control North Korean units in such an event.

The forward deployment of stealth aircraft in these two countries is a strategy of deterrence that will be repeated every spring from now until the North Korean regime collapses. It is also part of the American military's new 21st-century policy of rapid deployment of combat units normally stationed in Guam, Hawaii, or the continental U.S. to Asia or the Middle East in the event of crisis. This strategy is a significant part of what the U.S. refers to as the “transformation” of its military.

04

DEC

2006

Japan as a Nonnuclear Superpower: Responding to North Korea with Economic Sanctions

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

Controversy has erupted lately in Japan in the wake of North Korea 's nuclear test. The debate is over whether Japan should even debate whether to acquire nuclear weapons of its own.

Certain powerful legislators in the ruling Liberal Democratic Party have asserted that, now that a hostile neighbor has nukes, the Japanese must at least be willing to discuss whether they should get some of their own. Prime Minister Abe has displayed a tolerant attitude toward these pronouncements, ostensibly in the interests of respecting free speech. The opposition parties, however, fiercely oppose such discussions and their timing, claiming that they are merely an attempt to justify the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Japan .

Most Japanese citizens were shocked at the sudden breaking of a decades-long taboo against such talk by government officials. Many considered it contradictory at the least to castigate North Korea for going nuclear on the one hand while suggesting that Japan might be wise to do the same on the other.

Many Americans feel that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki brought an early end to the Second World War and thus saved more lives than they sacrificed. And during the Cold War, the possession of nuclear weapons was generally viewed as a deterrent to all-out nuclear war. Consequently Americans may find it difficult to understand the intense opposition of so many Japanese to even a discussion of the possibility of acquiring such weapons.

The reasons for this attitude gap may lie in a profound difference in how Japanese and Americans view war. The predominant American view seems to be that war is a legitimate undertaking when fought for the sake of liberty or justice. To the average Japanese, however, war is a crime, a cruel act of slaughter and destruction. And nuclear bombs are viewed as the cruelest weapons of all.

The Japanese attitude stems from the nation's experience during the last century, when the government's buildup of a massive military force, control of the education and thought of the citizenry, and glorification of war culminated in the worst catastrophe to ever befall Japan . When some Japanese begin arguing in earnest about the virtues of first-strike capability and nuclear deterrence, others inevitably feel a twinge of conscience and apprehension.

Yet the Japanese aversion to war was cultivated by none other than the United States . After the Second World War, the U.S. feared that Japan might someday again become a military superpower and threaten American supremacy in Asia and the Pacific. So in exchange for allowing Japan to rearm itself with only conventional weapons, the U.S. guaranteed the country's safety under its own defense umbrella.

Whatever its origins, most Japanese are grateful for this enforced pacifism. For the past 60 years Japan has not been embroiled in a single major war, has not been attacked by another country, and has grown into an economic giant.

In the wake of its nuclear test, North Korea announced that it would regard economic sanctions as a declaration of war. But Japan is not really afraid of North Korea 's newfound nuclear capability. Instead of responding by developing its own nukes, Japan has joined forces with other nations to impose tough economic sanctions on the country. Indeed, Japan is a rarity among superpowers today in its foregoing of nuclear deterrence as a national defense policy. In the 61st year of the nuclear age, Japan boasts the world's second greatest economy, yet it is a nonnuclear superpower.

If anything, North Korea 's nuclear test reminded the Japanese people that they do not need to depend on nuclear weapons to be a superpower.

27

SEP

2006

Abe's Magic Trick: Don't Revise the Constitution, Just Re-Define It

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst
Translated by Alan Gleason

Shinzo Abe has a reputation as a super-hawk who has argued in the past that Japan was justified in waging the Pacific War, and that the Class-A war criminals enshrined at Yasukuni are not really guilty. Now that he is prime minister, major changes can be expected in Japan's defense strategy. Perhaps the most significant change will be the lifting of Japan's self-imposed ban on “collective defense” -- in other words, joint combat operations with the United States.

Japan's Constitution expressly prohibits military action except when Japan itself is attacked by another country. Thus the Self-Defense Forces cannot even fight in tandem with U.S. forces under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, but must always be under separate command. The logic is that this separation is required because Japan's constitutionally recognized military objectives are necessarily different from U.S. military objectives. In short, Japan is prohibited from engaging in “collective defense” with the U.S. or anyone else.

In recent years, however, complaints grew louder that this was too strict an interpretation of the Constitution, one that hampered Japan's ability to respond to emergencies in its immediate vicinity. In 1999 a law was passed permitting the SDF to provide backup to U.S. forces, but only in “situations in areas surrounding Japan.” That is why, when SDF forces are dispatched to more outlying regions such as the Indian Ocean or Iraq, they are still not allowed to directly engage in joint combat operations with U.S. forces.

Suppose a Japanese warship were cruising alongside a U.S. ship in the Indian Ocean, and the U.S. ship was attacked. Under the logic that prohibits Japan from engaging in collective defense, the Japanese ship could do nothing to help. During his recent election campaign, Abe frequently cited this scenario in asserting the need to revise Japan's defense stance to allow the SDF to fight alongside U.S. forces.

The Self-Defense Forces were created, and grew during Japan's period of rapid economic growth, without a thought for the possibility of their engaging in combat overseas. The government's policy was from the outset one of self-defense only. Today, however, this notion of “exclusive self-defense” is treated as obsolete. For one thing, an SDF whose sole mission is self-defense really has no mission at all anymore, for the simple reason that Japan has no real enemies: not even China or North Korea would consider invading Japan itself.

Abe has declared that it is no longer feasible to skirt the issue of constitutionality by “interpreting” the Constitution; rather, he intends to confront the issue head-on by simply re-defining Japan's right to engage in collective defense. Until now, the government has taken the position that it could not lift the ban on collective defense without an actual revision to the Constitution. To get around this conundrum it has engaged in all kinds of semantic legerdemain, notably its “interpretation” that the Constitution actually recognizes Japan's right to collective defense, but not the exercise of this right. Now, however, Abe says, this “interpretation” strategy has reached its limit.

But, he also asserts, there is not time to wait for the parliament and public opinion to reach a consensus on revising the Constitution. Japan must abolish its restrictions on collective defense by re-defining it. That is the most significant change the Abe administration will bring to Japan's defense policy.

25

JUL

2006

Aftermath of the Taepodong Furor: North Korea Loses Its Diplomacy Card

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

On July 5 North Korea launched seven ballistic missiles: three Scuds, three Nodongs, and one new model, the Taepodong 2. However, the Taepodong exploded after only 40 seconds in the air, disappearing from the screens of the U.S. military radar that were tracking it.

No sooner were the missiles in the air than Japan went into hysterics. This time, however, unlike the furor aroused by the launch of the Taepodong 1 in August 1998, Japan's reaction was less about the Taepodong 2, a long-range ballistic missile developed to reach the United States. To Japan, the bigger threat is the Nodong, whose range encompasses the entire Japanese archipelago. As for the short-range Scuds, it was assumed that their ostensible target is the U.S. troops stationed in South Korea.

With the failure of the Taepodong, the United States was in a position to breathe easier. The government of South Korea, in keeping with its “sunshine policy” of recent years, for its part refrained from harshly criticizing the North. Instead, it criticized the Japanese government for overreacting to the missile tests.

Nonetheless, Japan went ahead and appealed to the United Nations Security Council to impose heavy sanctions on North Korea for threatening the peace of the region. In the end the Council rejected wording that would have backed sanctions with the threat of military force. However, the entire Council, including Russia and China, did adopt a resolution condemning North Korea for launching the missiles. This was a significant development in that it was the first time Japan had sponsored a Security Council resolution and seen it unanimously adopted, albeit in compromise form.

Then, at the G8 Summit held in St. Petersburg, Russia later that month, the Chair's Summary presented at the end of the summit expressed support for the U.N.'s condemnation of North Korea and urged a speedy resolution of the abduction issue as well. Japan's views had clearly gained acceptance.

With these gestures North Korea suddenly found itself facing a united front of international opposition. Its only remaining diplomatic card, the missile tests, had been neutralized. With its nuclear weapons development card already taken out of play through its participation in the six-way talks, North Korea was now bereft of its last two brinkmanship cards.

From this point on, North Korea's neighbors will begin preparing for the eventual collapse of the country's government. Their top priority will be to deliver food and medical supplies to the North Koreans as quickly as possible in order to prevent a massive exodus of refugees into surrounding countries. Japan is already holding secret consultations about such measures, including the use of its national stockpile of rice for this purpose.

29

MAY

2006

U.S. Military Realignment: What's the $20 Billion For?

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

On April 24 the American and Japanese governments agreed that Japan would pay US$6 billion of the cost of relocating the U.S. Marine Corps' division headquarters and several thousand troops from Okinawa to Guam. This would be a first; Japan has never shouldered the cost of military construction on U.S. territory before. There are no Japanese laws permitting this, nor were such payments made by Germany or South Korea when U.S. troops were relocated from those countries.

But that wasn't all. A bigger shock hit Japan the next day, April 25, when U.S. deputy undersecretary of defense Richard Lawless, who is in charge of the troop realignment, announced at a Pentagon press conference that in addition to the $6 billion for the move to Guam, Japan would have to pay another $20 billion for realignment-related costs inside Japan. Thus the total burden on the Japanese taxpayer would be some $26 billion.

But however one adds up all the potential expenses of restructuring the U.S. military presence in Japan, that $20 billion figure is difficult to justify.

The Marines have agreed to return Futenma Air Station to Okinawa. In its place a new runway is being built at the Marine Corps' Camp Schwab elsewhere on the island, to the tune of at most $3.1 billion (calculated at 114 yen to the dollar). Moving the U.S. Navy's carrier-based aircraft from Atsugi Naval Air Station in Kanagawa prefecture to the Marine Corps Iwakuni Air Station in Yamaguchi prefecture requires building a new 2,400-meter runway on reclaimed land. Already under construction, this is projected to cost a total of $2.1 billion. Even factoring in other realignment-related projects, the total comes nowhere near $20 billion.

When the U.S. agreed to return Okinawa to Japan in 1971, Japan secretly agreed to pay $4 million in “land restoration” costs that the U.S. was ostensibly paying to restore military property to its original state. Diplomatic documents about this secret agreement were discovered in Washington in May 2000 after they had been declassified. Bunroku Yoshino, head of the American Affairs Bureau at Japan's Foreign Ministry at the time of Okinawa's return, subsequently admitted to the existence of the secret agreement. However, the Japanese Government continues to deny its existence even today.

So why did Japan secretly bear the costs of restoring the U.S. bases? The U.S.-Japan agreement on the status of U.S. armed forces in Japan stipulates that the American government bears no responsibility for the restoration of returned base property. But the U.S. built its Okinawa bases on land it confiscated from the populace and covered with roads, buildings and other facilities. If the U.S. were to return this property as is, it would only highlight the inequities of the U.S.-Japan agreement. To prevent this from becoming an issue, the Japanese government quietly agreed to pay for the restoration of these lands while pretending that the U.S. had done so on its own initiative.

There is good reason to believe that similar secrets are hidden in the recent realignment agreement concluded between the U.S. and Japan. Even as suspicions grow in Japan about the actual terms of the pact, the government officials involved in the negotiations refuse to divulge details to Japan's parliament and its taxpayers.

29

MAR

2006

A Perspective from Japan

Can a Referendum in Iwakuni Change the Military's Plans?

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

  The Iwakuni Air Station is a U.S. Marine Corps air base in Yamaguchi Prefecture , not far from the city of Hiroshima in western Japan . Its use by the U.S. extends back to the Korean War, when it was active as the nearest air base to the Korean front.

  As part of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan , plans were announced last year to move 57 carrier-based aircraft to Iwakuni from the Atsugi Naval Air Facility outside Tokyo . Atsugi, in Kanagawa Prefecture near the huge U.S. Navy base at Yokosuka port, has been used for training flights by planes from the aircraft carriers that dock at Yokosuka . But the area around Atsugi has urbanized in recent years and the noise and danger of accidents involving the U.S. jets has become a controversial issue there. Hence the plan to move the aircraft to Iwakuni.

  The Iwakuni base intends to expand onto adjacent reclaimed land in the Inland Sea to accommodate the transfer. Construction is already underway with the goal of moving the base further away from the city center in three years.

  However, the current mayor of Iwakuni threw a wrench in the works by proposing a referendum by the citizens of Iwakuni on whether or not to accept the aircraft transfer. Those who favored the transfer (anticipating a windfall from the government in the form of regional development funds to offset "base-related costs") launched their own movement to boycott the referendum, saying the city had no business encouraging its citizens to vote on matters of national security. If fewer than 50 percent of the city's registered voters came out to vote, the referendum would be declared invalid.

  The balloting took place on March 12 -- the first time Japanese citizens had ever voted directly on the realignment of U.S. forces in the country. With 58% of eligible voters participating, the referendum was declared valid; when the votes were counted, a whopping 87% had rejected the aircraft transfer. Newspapers around Japan the next day trumpeted headlines like "Citizens Overwhelmingly Say No" and "Citizens Voice Their Opposition."

  But meanwhile, the next mayoral election in Iwakuni is scheduled for April 23. The incumbent mayor who proposed the referendum is running for reelection with the support of those who oppose the transfer. But the 87% anti-transfer vote on March 12 notwithstanding, no one is predicting that the incumbent will easily win. Unlike the referendum, which was legally non-binding, the mayoral election will be affected by a complex mix of interests on the part of the citizenry. The clout of powerful political organizations, corporations and industrial groups, and the promise of more money for the entire region will all be brought to bear. Therefore many pundits are placing their bets on a candidate who supports the aircraft transfer.

  If that happens, what, then, was the point of the referendum? The pro-transfer people claim it was just pre-election grandstanding by the incumbent. Will the citizens of Iwakuni decide that the development of their city suffers from the presence of this huge air base? Or that they must accept more hazardous aircraft precisely because their city can't develop on its own? Iwakuni faces a considerable dilemma.

24

JAN

2006

A Perspective from Japan :

The Yasukuni Problem

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

When Prime Minister Koizumi first stood for election to the premiership in April 2001, he publicly pledged to visit Yasukuni Shrine every August 15, the anniversary of the end of World War II.

China and Korea , both victims of Japanese aggression during the war, harshly criticized Koizumi's plan, saying it represented an attempt to legitimize Japan 's wartime behavior. Once Koizumi became prime minister, he visited the shrine on August 13 instead of 15 in hopes of avoiding further reaction, but this did nothing to mitigate China 's and Korea 's protests. Since then, Koizumi has been rebuffed in his efforts to hold one-on-one meetings with his counterparts from these countries.

Yasukuni Shrine is located in central Tokyo , right next to the Imperial Palace . It serves as a memorial to Japan 's military war dead, from the forces of the Meiji Restoration who toppled the Shogunate in the mid-19th century up through World War II. Until Japan 's surrender in 1945, Yasukuni was run by the Army and Navy Ministries. Mortality lists furnished by the ministries determined who would be formally honored as war dead at the shrine. Consequently there are no civilians memorialized there, despite the many who perished in the air raids and atomic bombings. Nor does the shrine honor postwar Self-Defense Force troops who die in the line of duty.

Why does Yasukuni Shrine wield such political influence? The answer lies with its close ties to the Japan War-Bereaved Families Association. Formed by veterans and next of kin after the war, the association, with its ability to mobilize a huge bloc of votes, became a major force in postwar politics. As its clout grew, so did that of the shrine with which it has been closely linked since the war.

In 1978, however, Yasukuni got into trouble when it enshrined fourteen Class-A war criminals, men who had been convicted by the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal (seven of them executed) for their leading roles in the war effort. From that point on, the shrine was accused of functioning as a religious institution that glorified World War II.

Koizumi has responded forcefully to his critics, declaring that other countries should not interfere in what he calls a “matter of the heart” and that he visits Yasukuni to honor those who lost their lives in the war and to pray for peace, not to glorify war.

Recently, however, the United States has been expressing concern that the Yasukuni Problem has brought diplomacy to a halt in East Asia . Even the majority of Japanese, while objecting to foreign meddling in their affairs, want the government to build a national monument to the war dead separate from Yasukuni.

More recently, media reports have revealed that certain ruling party politicians are quietly studying the designation of Kitanomaru Park , which also adjoins the Imperial Palace , as a national war memorial. Although the Kitanomaru proposal will not be formally divulged while Koizumi is still in office (his term expires in September this year), it could very likely gather steam once a new prime minister is in place.

2２

DEC

2005

A Perspective from Japan :

The Camp Schwab Heliport Plan: Another Narita Mess in the Making?

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

A new controversy has erupted in Okinawa, where the debate over the U.S. military presence is already at fever pitch. The latest outcry is over a proposal to build a new helicopter base for the U.S. Marines at Camp Schwab .

The existing helicopter facility at the Marines' Futenma Air Station in central Okinawa is surrounded by a densely populated residential area, where noise and the danger of helicopter accidents have become major issues for local residents. To reduce tensions, the Japanese and U.S. governments agreed on a plan to move Marine chopper operations from Futenma to Camp Scwhab in a more outlying part of the island.

The heliport would be built on the coast inside the base perimeter. Part of the 1800-meter runway and apron would occupy land where a military barracks now sits, but part of it would be built atop land reclaimed offshore.

The problem is that the two governments agreed to this plan without consulting or even informing local citizens. Neither the governor of Okinawa nor mayors in the affected districts were consulted.

The predictable result was an outcry from the Okinawans. Erstwhile supporters of the new base, who had anticipated a huge public works windfall, were disappointed to learn that most of the facility would be built much more cheaply onshore. Earlier plans had called for building the entire runway offshore, atop a coral reef. Meanwhile, residents near Camp Schwab opposed the onshore site because the helicopters would fly right over their homes. Joining those opposed to any base construction whatsoever were environmentalists who argued that offshore construction would threaten the habitat of the endangered dugong.

To reduce the burden borne by Okinawa, the U.S. military announced that it would return Futenma Air Station to the prefecture and move the command headquarters of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force and 7,000 troops from Okinawa to Guam . Yet despite this pledge, 90 percent of all Okinawans oppose the construction of the heliport at Camp Schwab .

The problem lies with the hasty behavior of the Japanese government, which blithely assumed that the locals would readily agree to a deal involving less landfill and hence less damage to the maritime environment than the original offshore plan.

When Japan 's mass media began covering local protests against the plan, powerful politicians from the ruling Liberal Democratic Party began paying visits to Okinawa . Ostensibly they went for the purpose of “explaining” the U.S.-Japan agreement, but according to some reports they also conveyed a threat: to freeze the 100 billion yen (US$840 million) in government funding earmarked for development of the island's north shore, if the protests did not stop.

And this is not the only financial help that Okinawans expect from the government. They also want unemployment assistance for the many civilians who will lose their jobs if bases are closed as part of the U.S. military's “transformation” project. Government aid is also sought for the maintenance of vacated base property, compensation to landowners, and further development funding for affected districts.

The fact that the Japanese and American governments agreed on a new heliport without even discussing these issues is what particularly outrages the Okinawans.

Japan has already promised the U.S. that it will complete the Camp Schwab heliport in five years. If the government unilaterally goes ahead with construction without obtaining the consent of the local populace, it is a recipe for a real fiasco. The last time something like this happened was thirty years ago, when the government began construction of Narita Airport near Tokyo without consulting the farmers living on the land.

There is now a real possibility that the Camp Schwab heliport will turn into a reincarnation of the Narita controversy.

20

Sep

2005

A Perspective from Japan:

Will China Swallow Up the Korean Peninsula? (Part 2)

         By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

                 Translated by Alan Gleason

History shows that nations built on peninsulas, such as Italy or Korea, tend to become battlegrounds for hegemony between continental powers invading from the mainland and maritime powers invading from the sea.

If Russia or China seeks to expand, the geopolitical characteristics of the Korean Peninsula make it an optimum route by which either of these land-based powers could extend their influence off the coast of Asia. Conversely, if Japan or the United States wishes to expand its sphere of influence on the Asian continent, the same peninsula offers the perfect beachhead.

Lately there have been some curious developments on the Korean Peninsula. North Korea's industrial infrastructure is a shambles. The country lacks electricity, an adequate telephone network, or the roads and railroads necessary to transport goods in any quantity. But suddenly, Chinese money is pouring into this same infrastructure. From US$400 million in 2000, China's annual investment in North Korea jumped to US$1.5 billion in 2004 ? twice the amount invested by South Korea.

When Japan annexed and ruled the Korean Peninsula from 1910 to 1945, it pursued a colonial policy of industrial development by exploiting the mineral resources in the North. Now, with its eye on that same underground wealth, China is building new factories in North Korea and increasing its imports of these resources. The North, which is particularly blessed with large iron ore deposits, contracted with China to export 600 thousand tons of ore in 2004 and 1 million tons in 2005. China has shouldered the burden of paying the 100 million yuan (about US$12.4 million) required for plant and equipment investment in North Korea's Musan Mine for this purpose.

China is moving into Korea in other ways besides investment and trade. China has its own ethnic Korean autonomous region, populated mostly by Koreans who fled to northeast China from their homeland during the era of Japanese rule. Recently the Chinese have ramped up their efforts to educate these ethnic Koreans that they are in fact a subset of ethnic Chinese. Specifically, they claim that the ancient Koguryo Dynasty, which ruled the northern part of the peninsula for several hundred years until 668 A.D., was not a Korean kingdom but in fact belonged to China. By logical extension, the Korean Peninsula can then be viewed as a region originally populated by ethnic Chinese and therefore rightfully Chinese territory.

While the South Korean government has fiercely objected to this argument, no such protestations have been forthcoming from the North. Quite the contrary, the North Koreans praise China's economic inroads into their country as a form of “reinforcement,” and they welcome the investments and factory construction.

In a very short span of time, China has established an economic sphere of influence in Southeast Asia through its development of the Mekong region. It has formed alliances with countries in Central Asia to obstruct the spread of Islamic radicalism. And it has set up a strategic partnership with Russia through which the two nations are rapidly tightening their military ties. That leaves the east, where China is now pursuing a goal of hegemony over the Korean Peninsula ? not by force of arms, but through economic aid. That is, indeed, China's traditional strategy.

１７

Ｊｕｌｙ

2005

A Perspective from Japan:

Will China Swallow Up the Korean Peninsula? (Part 1)

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analys

                      Translated by Alan Gleason

This past July, China suddenly launched diplomatic offensives on several fronts. First, Chairman Hu Jintao visited Russia and met with President Putin; the two heads of state agreed to form a strategic Russo-Chinese partnership to counter the unilateralist behavior of the United States. Russia also promised to give China top priority in its oil exports. These agreements became possible when the two countries resolved their long-standing border disputes in June, thus removing the single biggest obstacle to their rapprochement. They also agreed to cooperate in the development of China's Northeast region (formerly known as Manchuria).

Then, starting on July 4, the Chinese hosted the Second Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Summit in Kunming, Yunnan province, with Premier Wen Jiabao attending. Rather than attempt to control the South China Sea with its relatively weak Navy, China seeks to make economic inroads into Southeast Asia via the Mekong River, which it is developing into a major transport artery. Engineers have blown up rocks that obstruct river traffic and constructed new harbors all along the waterway. Roads have been built from these harbors to more landlocked provinces. All of this construction is funded by China. As a result, the other countries along the Mekong ? Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Viet Nam ? are now flooded with Chinese goods.

At the GMS Summit, Premier Wen promised even more aid. As payment for agricultural imports from Thailand, China agreed to give the Thais 132 armored vehicles, worth about 40 million dollars. Last year Myanmar completed three hydroelectric power plants with financial assistance from China; now the Chinese have promised to help Laos build a hydroelectric plant too. China in effect has funded a full three-fifths of Myanmar's total electric power output.

China is also laying an oil pipeline to Myanmar. Once it is completed, China will no longer need to transport oil from the Mideast through the Malacca Straits, but over a more secure inland route to Yunnan. China views the U.S. Navy's presence in the Malacca Straits as a threat.

After his summit with President Putin, Chairman Hu attended another summit in Kazakhstan with the leaders of member states of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). Consisting of China, Russia, and the four Central Asian nations of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, the SCO announced that in exchange for cooperating in the security of Central Asia, China would be supplied with oil and natural gas from Kyrgyzstan. The summit participants also demanded that the United States announce a timetable for the withdrawal of American troops from Central Asia. It is inevitable that the nations of this region pay more heed to their giant neighbors, Russian and China, than to American economic assistance or military might.

Thus in a flurry of diplomatic moves, China has enhanced its security and influence on three sides ? to the south, through its GMS development programs; to the north, through a strategic alliance with Russia and joint development of the Northeast; and to the west, through its success in uniting Central Asia behind a pro-China, anti-U.S. stance via the SCO.

That leaves the east, and there, China is making preparations to establish its hegemony over the Korean Peninsula. If China can bring the entire peninsula under its influence, it will be like a dagger pointed straight at Japan, as far as the Japanese are concerned. Just how does China propose to go about achieving this? I will attempt to answer that question in the second part of this article.

25

may

2005

          A Perspective from Japan :

                 Much Ado about North Korea 's Nuclear Non-Test

                   By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

                                                Translated by Alan Gleason

Just as the population of Japan was settling into its annual Golden Week holiday in early May, it was buffeted by a stream of media reports that North Korea would be conducting a nuclear test sometime in June. The first such announcement appeared in the New York Times. The Times article cited claims by White House and Pentagon officials that frequent convoys of military trucks had been seen visiting a site on the east central coast of North Korea, that an abandoned mine there was being filled in with huge amounts of earth, that an observation platform was being constructed nearby. The article explained that these were all signs of preparation for an underground nuclear test. The article appeared just before the start of a nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) conference in New York , the first such meeting in five years.

The Times report sent Japan into a panic, and related rumors began to fly thick and fast. North Korea was going to conduct the test because America had ignored the regime's February declaration that it possessed nuclear weapons. Or, North Korea 's military badly wanted the test, and leader Kim Jong Il could not ignore the military's demands. What was more, even an underground test would release radioactivity into the air, sending a deadly fallout cloud in Japan 's direction. One sports tabloid claimed that at the U.S. air base on Guam , B-2 bombers were being readied for a pre-emptive strike to prevent the test.

Major Japanese newspapers quoted a former senior CIA official as saying that North Korea had “five to eight” nuclear weapons on hand. Even Mohamed El Baradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency , declared that the possession of nukes by North Korea was a real possibility.

But think about it for a moment. The mission of the U.S. intelligence establishment is not to share, with the entire world, intelligence about North Korea 's nuclear arsenal. Rather, its job is to manipulate information in order to mobilize world opinion against the North Korean regime and further isolate it. The White House, Pentagon, and CIA already have a track record of deliberately leaking information -- including false information -- to the press for such purposes. The current brouhaha most likely began with an intentional leak to a Times reporter of just such disinformation about signs of an impending nuclear test in North Korea . This scenario makes perfect sense in the context of the information war currently being waged.

Eventually, several senior Chinese government officials issued declarations that China would respond in the strongest terms to any nuclear test by North Korea , and that China had sternly warned North Korea not to develop nuclear weapons. The head of South Korea 's own intelligence agency then announced to members of the South Korean parliament's intelligence committee that there was no sign of movement by North Korea to conduct a nuclear test, and that reports to that effect were “incorrect.” With that, the hysteria finally subsided.

North Korea is using its “nuclear card” as a bluff to get the United States to negotiate with it directly. In exchange for a promise not to acquire nuclear arms, it hopes to win guarantees for the survival of the Kim Jong Il regime. However, the U.S. government has its own agenda, which is to intentionally exaggerate these threats by North Korea and use them to demonize and isolate the regime in the eyes of the rest of the world.

The Japanese were thrown into a panic by the nuclear test reports because they do not understand this state of affairs. Their ignorance is due in part to Japan 's lack of its own intelligence-gathering organization, and in part to the appalling lack of military knowledge by the country's journalists. One can only hope that the Japanese learned something from the recent North Korean nuclear test scare.

22

Mar

2005

                       A Perspective from Japan :

 Security without Forces? Why the U.S. Wants to Move Its Military                    Headquarters to Japan and Withdraw Its Troops

                               By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

                                                  Translated by Alan Gleason

Even with the Cold War long over, the United States military has kept 100,000 troops in East Asia, mostly in Japan and South Korea . Their presence has been part of a strategy of forward deployment to prepare for military contingencies. Stationing all these troops in East Asia is, however, prohibitively expensive for the U.S. , and such overseas assignments are not popular with the troops themselves. Moreover, the noise and crime generated by American military bases in places like Okinawa imposes a heavy burden on local residents. And since there is currently no military draft, the commitment of troops to forward deployment in East Asia exacerbates the severe troop shortage the U.S. is experiencing in its war on terrorism.

Consequently, the U.S. has begun a process of "transformation" of its troop deployments around the world. In East Asia, transformation basically consists of abandoning the forward deployment strategy, pulling U.S. combat forces back to the homeland and a few outposts like Guam , and readying them for rapid deployment anywhere, anytime.

But if the U.S. simply pulls its troops out of East Asia , it will leave a military vacuum in its wake. If China moves in to fill that vacuum, America will lose its presence in East Asia altogether. Thus the U.S. must find a way to pull its troops back as part of the transformation process without allowing a power vacuum where they used to be. And indeed, far from reducing the U.S. military presence in East Asia, the transformation that is about to begin in Japan has the objective of actually reinforcing that presence.

The American military transformation began with the articulation of common strategic objectives with South Korea and Japan . Without shared objectives, the countries would not be able to cooperate effectively in event of an emergency. Next, the U.S. began consolidating and closing its overseas military bases, returning unneeded facilities to their host countries.

To compensate, U.S. forces reorganized themselves for greater mobility and more rapid deployment abroad, so as to be ready to respond to any contingency. For example, lightweight armored vehicles, which can be moved long distances in a short time by transport plane, have taken priority over heavy tanks. Light vehicles are adequate for combat with guerrillas or terrorists, the thinking goes.

With their lightweight weaponry and hi-tech troops, U.S. forces are well prepared for actual war. The problem is how to increase American influence in East Asia in times of peace. This is a political, not just a military, problem.

The solution devised by the Americans is to place the East Asian headquarters for their Army, Navy and Air Force right in Japan . Headquarters for the Navy's 7th Fleet are already in Yokosuka . Plans call for transfer of the headquarters of the U.S. Army's First Corps from Washington State to Camp Zama outside Tokyo , with an Army officer of full General rank replacing the current Lieutenant General as commander. And the 5th Air Force headquarters at Yokota Air Base, also outside Tokyo , are to be integrated with the 13th Air Force headquarters in Guam . Yokota will then serve as the Air Force's command center for both East Asia and the West Pacific.

These realignments will ensure that the U.S.-Japan security apparatus enjoys an even bigger presence in East Asia than it does now. And who will guard these various U.S. command posts? Japan 's Self-Defense Forces, of course.

In short, the Japanese-American military alliance is moving toward a security arrangement that requires no actual U.S. troops in Japan .

25

JAN

2005

Japan's National Security

         The SDF Comes In From the Cold War

                   By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

                      Translated by Alan Gleason

Over 200,000 people died in the tsunami that struck countries around the Indian Ocean last December, and a massive worldwide effort has been launched to bring aid to the survivors.

In addition to sending out emergency relief teams, the Japanese government has dispatched over 800 Self-Defense Force (SDF) personnel to the Indonesian island of Sumatra. This includes five transport helicopters (three CH-47s and two UH-60s) and a medical team from the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF) (a total of 200 troops); a large transport ship, a supply ship and an escort from the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) (600 troops); and one or two C-130 transport planes from the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) (40 troops). This may be a drop in the bucket compared to the aircraft carrier and 13,000 troops committed by the United States, but it is the largest single overseas deployment in the history of Japan's SDF.

Just as significant, this will be the first time the three Self-Defense Force branches have operated together under a single joint command. Coordination of air, sea and land forces is not unusual for the U.S. military, but it is another first for the SDF. The reason is simple: since the early, prewar days of Japan's modern armed forces, its Army and Navy have never gotten along. When the Army wanted to invade China, the Navy had its sights set on domination of the West Pacific, and their strategies often clashed (there was no separate Air Force at the time).

Until the establishment after World War II of the National Defense Academy, young officers entering the various branches of the military could not even be trained at the same school. But even in recent years, communications among the SDF's Ground, Maritime and Air troops have been poor. In August 1985, a domestic Japan Air Lines jumbo jet crashed in the mountains west of Tokyo, killing 520. SDF troops were dispatched to the site, but the radios of the GSDF ground patrols and the ASDF rescue helicopters could not transmit to each other, seriously hampering rescue operations. This tragic blunder spurred the various SDFs to subsequently undertake frequent joint-command exercises. Still, formidable barriers remain among the three forces in the field. As recently as the aftermath of the Niigata earthquake last fall, coordination was abysmal with relief troops dispatched by one branch often unaware of what others in the same district were doing.

Off the coast of Sumatra, however, GSDF troops will use a MSDF transport ship as a hotel ship. And at the rescue command post set up by U.S. forces at Thailand's Utapao military base, members of the three SDFs will form a joint command to coordinate their activities, while C-130 transport planes will fly supplies from there to ASDF and MSDF troops in Indonesia.

The entire operation, in fact, serves as a trial run for the SDF's new basic strategy for the era after the North Korea crisis : “defense of the outlying islands.” It is a perfect test case for the more integrated operations planned by the three branches to guard the string of Japanese islands that runs from southern Kyushu nearly to Taiwan.

The ASDF has fighters and attack planes capable of bombing seaborne forces or enemy troops landing on these islands. The MSDF has transport ships for carrying GSDF troops to the islands, and combat ships to assist them. It is precisely this type of coordination by the three branches that the SDF wishes to test.

The purpose of the new strategy is, of course, to check attempts by the Chinese military to expand its sphere of influence from the East China Sea into the West Pacific. However, it would not be accurate to say that Japan anticipates war with China. Rather, Japan hopes that by bolstering its defense of these outlying islands, it can discourage China from engaging in undesirable flexing of its military muscle. The point of increasing the SDF's presence in the islands, and indeed, the point of much of Japan's military planning from now on, is to keep China in check.

Thus Japan's military has begun the process of sloughing off the cumbersome armor of the Cold War and slipping into something more comfortable ? a new, lighter, faster, more flexible SDF.

2４

ＯＣＴ

200４

A Perspective from Japan:

"Exclusive Defense": An Obsolete Buzzword

By Motoaki Kamiura, Military Analyst

Translated by Alan Gleason

When Japan created its Self-Defense Forces a half-century ago -- and even 30 years ago, when I enlisted in the SDF -- politicians and constitutional scholars who supported the SDF often trumpeted the concept of "exclusive" or "non-aggressive" defense -- in other words, national defense strictly for defensive purposes -- to drown out any concerns voiced about the constitutionality of Japan's military.